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Anderson: Operations in the Boulogne Area

by Lieutenant-Colonel J.E. Anderson, Officer Commanding,
North Shore Regiment, Given to Historical Officer,
27 September 1944

I
It had been appreciated from the first that
the assault on the BOULOGNE fortress would
have to do more than destroy the main belt of
defences. Situated as they were in a semicircle
on the high ground around BOULOGNE, these
defences certainly represented the chief
obstacles, but any attack on them would be
seriously prejudiced by the presence of equally
strong positions n o r t h of BOULOGNE —
especially at LA TRESORERIE. This village
was the site of a three-gun coastal battery of
305 mm guns and was of course heavily
fortified. The strongpoint, while not part of
the BOULOGNE fortress, could effectively
intervene in its defence by reason of its
powerful a r m a m e n t and its favourable
position on commanding ground. It offered
particularly strong support to FORT DE LA
CRECHE, the northernmost anchor of the
defensive system. It is doubtful in fact if the
fort could have been captured so quickly had
n o t LA TRESORERIE b e e n p r e v i o u s l y
eliminated.
North Shore Regiment was therefore
committed to an attack on this strongpoint
before the main assault was launched against
the BOULOGNE defences proper. It was
understood also that the battalion would
continue its more or less independent action
to remove all opposition from the rectangle
roughly enclosed by LA TRESORERIE,
WIMILLE and WIMEREUX.
The battalion, located in the vicinity of
MANINGHEN-HENNE, d u e e a s t of its

objectives, prepared to study the situation
some days prior to the operation. Owing to
the skilful m a n n e r in which all enemy
positions had been made mutually supporting,
a further complication came to light. LA
TRESORERIE was itself supported by enemy
positions on a feature j u s t to the north, the
PAS DE GAY. This hell overlooked the
approaches to LA TRESORERIE and its
capture was rightly interpreted by the CO as
being the key to a successful attack.
When therefore on 14 September 1944 a
patrol worked itself onto the PAS DE GAY the
CO at once ordered the position reinforced
and consolidated. It was touch and go for one
night but ultimately the hill was successfully
taken. The PAS DE GAY was found to form
part of the extensive system of observation
posts t h r o u g h o u t the area and was an
excellent vantage point.
It contained a
junction box of 210 wires, linking all the
posts, and in enemy hands it might well have
disrupted an attack on LA TRESORERIE.
Other patrols set about cleaning up all
enemy positions outside the wire which
encircled the principal fortification, so as to
leave no troublesome outposts. The wire
itself was carefully studied, the scout platoon
leader even taking bearings on its depth.
II
At 0930 hours, 17 September 1944, the
attack on LA TRESORERIE was begun, after
30 minutes of artillery preparation. The
heavy bombing programme which preceded
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The German coastal battery of three 305 mm guns near La Trésorerie north of Boulogne.
WLU Air Photo

the main assault on BOULOGNE was still in
progress. "A" Company on the right and "B"
Company on the left crossed the road between
WACQUINGHEN and MANINGHEN-HENNE,
which was the startline, and advanced
westward, crossing the BOULOGNE-CALAIS
highway. The ground beyond the highway
was heavily mined and wired. The wire was
breached by bangalore torpedoes, but the
anti-personnel mines caused fairly heavy
losses. Two platoons of "D" Company on the
PAS DE GAY had dug in on the south slope to
give fire support to the assaulting companies.
The remainder of "D" Company was in
WACQUINGHEN; "C" C o m p a n y was in
MANINGHEN-HENNE.

165/3005

a i r b u r s t - 2 0 mm flak from LA TRESORERIE
itself and 75 mm from WIMILLE. The 20 mm
fire Lieutenant-Colonel Anderson described
as most effective against infantry, invariably
pinning them down.
The advance was
stopped, all movement being impossible.
Enemy defensive fire tasks were brought down
over the main road, with such accuracy it was
hard not to admire. WACQUINGHEN, in
which advanced Battalion HQ was located,
was also shelled during the afternoon.

The enemy had been surprised by the
cross-country direction of the attack, which
he had evidently expected to come in along
the main highway. The two forward companies
were able to rush the outer defences on the
northeast side before coming under fire. The
20 mm flak guns on the perimeter were not
even manned.

To assist the forward companies an effort
was made to bring up the Flails and Crocodiles.
But such profuse armour-piercing shot met
them that they were unable to move up the
hill and had to remain back behind its cover.
Thus no lanes could be beaten through the
minefields. The Wasps were not used and two
were lost by mine explosions. A troop of
M 10s, however, firing by observation at about
1,800 yards range from MANINGHEN-HENNE,
gave excellent direct support, taking on the
20 mm flak pillboxes which ringed the
objective.

When they had got onto the east side of
the objective "A" and "B" Companies were
discovered and subjected to a storm of

At dusk "A" Company pushed forward to
the northernmost gun-casement and after
much grenade throwing succeeded in In the
85
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capturing about half of it. In the other half
was the power plant, which the enemy
continued to operate, so that the attackers
had the luxury of electric light and radio.
Company HQ had established itself in a house
nearby but had to vacate it during the night
when it was set afire by German tracer shells.
"B" Company in the darkness dug in and
improved its p o s i t i o n s ; s t r o n g p a t r o l s
reconnoitred the casemates and captured the
battery hospital. The enemy evidently had no
stomach for night patrols and was easily
panicked by them.
During the night carrying p a r t i e s
crawled up to "A" and "B" Companies to bring
t h e m food a n d a m m u n i t i o n .
Wireless
communication with them had ceased, until
extra batteries arrived with the relief parties.
18 set communication had been very spotty.
All in all it was a very unpleasant night.
The next morning, 18 September 1944,
"A" Company completed the capture of its
casemate and cleaned out a smaller gun
position with PIATs. "B" Company on the left
pushed ahead again, making much use of
phosphorus bombs, and the second large gun
position surrendered. The third fell a little
later.

The final task was the clearing of the
fortified observation posts northwest of the
hilltop. This was carried out by "B" Company.
During the afternoon the position was shelled
from three sides-from WIMILLE, WIMEREUX
and CAP GRIS NEZ. But there was no further
trouble with mines.
The cost had not been light.
Both
companies had gone into the attack at
strength; at its conclusion "A" Company
numbered about 70 men and "B" 60 men.
They had taken around 450 PW. Throughout
the rest of the operation these two companies
remained on LA TRESORERIE hill.
Stronger fortifications could hardly have
existed. The casemates had been u n s h a k e n
by heavy bombing. Each on contained a
complete electric plant and diesel engine,
which were kept in running order by a few
prisoners who were retained for the purpose.
The quarters, well heated and lit, were most
comfortable. The garrison was nearly all
German; most of them were marines. Perhaps
because of the superior facilities of their
q u a r t e r s they looked cleaner and more
soldierly than the usual prisoners. Their
ammunition supply was in no way depleted.

Two views of the No.2 casemate at Battery Lindemann. It is
believed that the damage to the gun was caused by the premature
explosion of a round of ammunition. The chainmail screen draped
over the gun served to protect its crewfrom shrapnel. Note the huge
crater injront of the "Jake gun" caused by the near miss of an aerial
bomb.
CFPU PMR 94-257 & 94-256
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There was ample stock of food, which
might have lasted three months. The battery
also p o s s e s s e d a dug-in, well-equipped
hospital.
III
The next p h a s e was the c a p t u r e of
WIMILLE, which was undertaken the following
day, 19 September 1944. "C" Company,
leaving MANINGHEN-HENNE, advanced
westwards along the road running parallel to
the WIMEREUX River.
Meeting heavy
opposition from the eastern side of WIMILLE
the company circled left to the south and
remained there for the night. Next morning,
with the assistance of supporting fire by
M10s, the town was attacked and captured.
Then AUVRINGHEN was cleared of enemy.
From this whole area about 465 PW were
taken.
IV
There remained now only the coast town
of WIMEREUX. In preparation for the attack,
B a t t a l i o n HQ was moved to WIMILLE.
WIMEREUX was understood to be empty of
civilians, but the CO believed many still
remained there. He was therefore loath to
employ the two AGRAs made available to him,
and accepted instead only one field regiment
for support. "C" and "D" Companies were to
be directed on the town and an early start was
hoped for. This was impossible, however,
since "D" Company had to move into position
from its location on the PAS DE GAY and zero
hour could thus be set no earlier that 1200
hours, 21 September 1944.
As t h e a t t a c k b e g a n , "A" a n d "B"
Companies manned the western flak positions
on LA TRESORERIE hill and fired these light
German weapons into WIMEREUX. They
made a terrific noise and served to bolster the
slight artillery support, without, however,
smashing the town so extensively.

Here they were pinned down in the valley by
machine-gun fire from the high railway
embankment along the eastern edge of the
town. But on the left "C" Company was
advancing from AUVRINGHEN t h r o u g h
GAZEMETZ and soon took out the fire,
capturing about 100 PW. Heavier fire came
also from FORT DE LA CRECHE, to the
southwest, but did not hold up the advance,
for "C" Company entered WIMEREUX near
the railway station. "D" Company, now
released, crossed the river further east and
came into the town near the railway bridge.
Effective close support was given again by
M 10s positioned in AUBENGUE.
The capture of WIMEREUX was completed
on 22 S e p t e m b e r 1944.
The g a r r i s o n
commander, a colonel, had escaped by making
his way along the beach to FORT DE LA
CRECHE, where he was soon taken prisoner
anyway. The rest surrendered. The town's
principal defences faced seawards and were
so extensive that Lieutenant-Colonel
Anderson considered them impregnable. The
armament was of various sorts: in addition to
the numerous 20 mm flak guns, North Shore
Regiment even came on an aged French "75"
with wooden wheels, and several huge mortars
of the spigot type. The usual well-equipped
hospital, which even contained a radio station,
was also there.
The town was thronged with civilians,
which confirmed the CO's belief and made
him glad that they had been able to capture
it without the devastating effect of so much
artillery. The troops were warmly greeted.
Lieutenant-Colonel Anderson was of the
opinion that the prime factor contributing to
the success of the operation was the fact that
adequate time had been given to the battalion
to acquaint itself thoroughly with the nature
of the task before it.

"D" Company moved from the PAS DE
GAY parallel to the railway, crossing it at a
p o i n t n o r t h of WIMEREUX, a n d t h e n
proceeded south towards WIMEREUX Farm.
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The town of Wimereux captured by the North Shore Regiment on 21/22 September 1944. The high railway
embankment is evident just behind the town.
WLU Air Photo 165/3002
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